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In The Supreme Court of The State of Utah 
JOHN C. CRITCHLOW and 
SOPHIA CRITCHLOW, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
JAY L. CRITCHLOW and LOIS 
CRITCHLOW, his wife; FUNNON T. 
SHIMMIN and DONNA SHIMMIN, 
his wife; and VERA SHIMMIN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
VERA SHIMMIN. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by appellants in August, 
1973, following a partition suit between the Critchlow 
brothers decided in September, 1971, whereby the 
former court divided the Critchlow property into two 
separate parcels of grazing lands and appellants Critch-
low seek in this suit to establish a vehicular easement by 
prescription over the lands of respondents Shimmin 
Case No. 
13738 
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and as a consequence thereof to claim a way of necessity 
over the partitioned lands of the respondents Critchlow. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The properties of the parties are grazing lands in a 
mountainous area north of Price, Utah, which were 
unsegregated by complete fencing between the Critch-
low parts and Shimmin parts until the middle 1950's 
(Tr. 229-230, 245). The respondent Vera Shimmin and 
her husband, Foster Shimmin, who died in 1962, 
bought their lands in 1935, while the Critchlows ac-
quired their lands in parcels both before and after the 
Shimmin acquisition (Tr 8-9, 233, 238, 258). For the last 
40 years approximately, the cattle have had access in 
late spring of each year to the grazing lands of the parties 
by drifting up Deadman Canyon from the south and 
have returned to the valley in late fall the same way. (Tr 
226-227, 230-236, 247-248). 
In 1971 the partition suit between John Critchlow 
and Jay Critchlow divided the Critchlow lands into 
separate parcels, as a result of which Jay Critchlow 
trucks his cattle to his property from the north (red 
property on Exhibit 1), and John Critchlow can drift his 
cattle on and off the mountain on the south property 
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(marked green on Exhibit 1) the same as in years past (Tr 
283-284). 
The issue of the case arises because John Critchlow 
claims the right of vehicular access over the Shimmin 
property (marked in yellow on Exhibit 1) by prescrip-
tive right to get to said green tract, whereas the cattle on 
the green tract were serviced by Critchlows after the 
fences were completed in 1953, until the partition suit 
in 1971, by using the intermediate Mathis tract (marked 
white on Exhibit 1) under an exchange agreement (Tr 
66, 279-281). 
The Complaint filed herein is entirely couched in 
terms of demanding vehicular traffic over the Shimmin 
roadway on the yellow tract together with a vehicle use 
of necessity on the road over the red tract partitioned to 
the respondent Jay Critchlow. The respondent Vera 
Shimmin emphatically disagrees that since July, 1948, a 
roadway has existed and been used by appellants over 
the route contended for by appellants as stated on Page 5 
of appellants brief. The record shows no evidence in-
itiating a prescriptive user against the respondent Vera 
Shimmin or against her deceased husband, owners of 
the property since 1935, which would establish any 
adverse, hostile, continuous, open, notorious or exclu-
sive right of use by appellants over the Shimmin proper-
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ty. Said Complaint alleges in paragraph 20 thereof the 
interruption of appellants' use of said alleged prescrip-
tive easement by Shimmins on or about September 29, 
1971. Any prescriptive right of use must be proven as to 
the commencement, extent and duration in the record 
against the owners of the lands for a full 20 year period. 
No witness nor the appellants testified of an enforced 
right of entry at any time nor of any circumstances 
where the Shimmins would be put on notice that the 
plaintiffs had commenced to earn a right by conquest or 
adverse user for 20 years. The record is also absent any 
showing by appellants that they could not operate their 
green parcel for a cattle grazing operation in the histori-
cal manner on horseback without using any road from 
the north over Shimmins property. Vera Shimmin tes-
tified she personally occupied said property for several 
weeks each summer from 1935 to 1962 (when her hus-
band died) riding horses all over the acreage, planting 
grass and sowing seed from horseback, salting by horse-
back, marking calves ears, fixing fences, keeping house 
in the cabins and riding horses up and down Deadman 
Canyon, and she testified Critchlows had no reason to 
come across the Shimmin property and she saw no one 
using her property or roadway during those years (Tr 
223-231). She further therein testified you couldn't 
drive a car south of the first cabin inside the gate and 
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had to go o n horseback M ;.;;: >, *. : . ; .muesiei 
bu l l dozed the sagebrnsh d o w n ami ;nai Iheieai'tei her 
nasbai id ami sonr% hired hea\ v eqmpmem <i f 11 i nuidc* * in-
road south lo the rin m Pe>0 HI P i a i and huilt ' e-: 
fences unto * ompleted in pr>4 | Pi 228-229), ( lertamh 
t h is evident e is in conf ln t v*. ith die statement on Page 5 
ot a p p e l l a n t oriel 11-• i* appel lant* ,imi Mien witnesses 
testif ied thM the r igh: nt u n v \ \ns 'e-ed 1>\ appedhints 
o \er m t-nisn* length t *-- >m !'»20 !o M H 8 ami thereafter 
Dean Sllill im in , - ' - a : t es t i f i ed he tan nattle in 
partnership w i t h his brother and lather and helped 
b u i l d the road ai id fences istiti 1 l'»:•"• • : • • • l i e de-
scr ibed h o w Cr i t ch lows came through in t )< toher, 1952, 
the first year the road \v;i« comple ted , in go hunt ing, h-r 
h o w he parked his u n at mss Mie road a *ne n.n ks »• 
October, 1953, b locked the w a\ assei ied ownersh ip ol 
the road in h i - fathe? ,un! s topped the appel lant Inhu 
Cr i tch ln . \\ an jjmm: : n.mi^h (! r 272 2741. 
Stan Dui renne testified that n: *952 at n n m d - u p 
t ime, aunt ie^ son. i . \nn Shnnnun . nroke off ' t h e lock 
p l a i n ! < n i ,ate 2 h \ i • H H i ' s u v . n - --, •? : e-! jay and 
G>rne* : lo lmi <-rilehle^ ,s.: . o . - ve ; i ^o . ? gale In the 
S h i m m i n properts aga n I he nv\\ ^ ear and thereafter 
l /unnon S h i m m m supp l ied the ke\ tor 'm '•;• k : h 
1
 ? < f » - ] N ; • ?i . j i i i o i 1 Sh inun in locked the gates beginn ing 
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in 1953 and constantly since 1955 and replaced Gate 2 
with a metal gate in the early 1960's; he prevented 
Critchlows two or three times from coming through, 
gave Critchlows permission to scatter salt as a 
neighborly gesture, furnished all the locks after the first 
one (broken off by Lynn Shimmin) and allowed Critch-
lows to buy a key at the airport when he changed locks 
(Tr 250-281). Shimmins controlled their road through 
the years as far as Critchlows were concerned and did 
all of the work and paid all of the expense without 
assistance in maintaining the roadway, even on the part 
over the red parcel from the Park belonging to Critch-
lows (Tr 12, 253, 260-261). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN FINDING 
THAT THE USE OF THE ROADWAY BY APPEL-
LANTS WAS PERMISSIVE RATHER THAN PRE-
SCRIPTIVE. 
If the judge in the lower court found the facts for the 
respondents under a conflict of evidence, the appellants 
are quoting the law uselessly to apply to facts in the 
record which obviously the judge disbelieved. The 
parade of explorers and hunters offered as witnesses, as 
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well as the appellants, that they motored on "the road" 
for years before 1948 when Chidester's bulldozer 
opened the road were undoubtedly not believed by the 
trial judge. The testimony of those who built and main-
tained the road (Shimmins) after 1948 was apparently 
believed by the trial judge. Finding No. 4 of the Findings 
of Fact by the trial judge says in effect that * 'the use of the 
roadway by the Plaintiffs over the property of the De-
fendants Shimmin at all times in the past has been 
permissive and that said use has not at any time been 
adverse, hostile, notorious or antagonistic to the rights 
of the Defendants Shimmin.,, 
Even the alleged motor trip in 1936 by John Critch-
low out to Section 31 to place salt was in the company of 
Mr. Foster Shimmin over his property and it would 
have to be assumed was by the permission of Mr. 
Shimmin as owner (Tr 18). All of the witnesses of re-
spondents testified it was impossible to get a motor 
vehicle south of the rocks to Section 31 before 1948 
when Chidester took his bulldozer out over the rim to 
improve the cattle trail (Tr 279). What fact or incident 
changed the user of John Critchlow from "permissive" 
in the company of Foster Shimmin in 1936 to adverse? 
The record is silent as to any adverse use by Critchlows 
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brought home to the owners and acquiesced in by them 
for 20 years continuously and uninterruptedly. 
25 American Jurisprudence 2nd 252-272 is a fine 
article on the prescriptive right of way and it lists the 
following requirements to establish prescription, to-
wit: 
A. Continuous 
B. Uninterrupted 
C. Open (not secret or hidden) 
D. Notorious (known or visible to owner) 
E. Adverse or hostile to owner 
F. Use of definite right in land of another 
G. Claim of right with connection to dominant 
tenement 
H. Exclusive right to use (not dependent on use 
of others) 
I. Invasion (^infringement on rights of owner 
without license or permission of owner 
J. Disregard for rights of owner 
K. Assertion of rights of user to initiate period 
of use 
L. Acquiescence or knowledge of the servient 
owner by passive assent, submission, 
quiescence or consent by silence to adverse 
and inconsistent user 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
M. For the required period (20 years in Utah) 
All of the strict and extensive requirements must be 
met to establish a prescriptive right of way and the 
extent of the use acquired must be consistent for the 
whole period and defined with certainty and definite-
ness. To countermand the finding of the lower court 
trial judge would require that this record have no evi-
dence of permissive use and that said use was uncon-
trovertibly adverse, hostile, notorious and antagonistic 
to the rights of respondents Shimmin. Such is not this 
record in this case. 
Under the Statement of Facts it is clear that Shim-
mins did not complete their fences to divide off the 
Critchlow lands until about 1953 or 1954. The road was 
built in 1951 or 1952 to work on the fences. 25 American 
Jurisprudence 2nd at page 457 states that where a way is 
over uninclosed land, there is a presumption that the 
use was permissive or at least that there is no presump-
tion that the use was adverse. There certainly is no 
positive evidence of adversity in the use before 1952. 
When did the adverse use period of twenty (20) years 
begin in this case? The Complaint alleges that respon-
dents blocked the roadway to appellants on or about 
September 29, 1971. 
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25 Am. Jur. 2nd 453 states "Nor can one acquire title 
by adverse user where his user is as a member of the 
public, in common with all others exercising and enjoy-
ing the privilege of use, since the use in such a case is 
not exclusive." The witnesses of appellants who were 
joy-riders, hunters, neighbors or explorers who claimed 
they went on the Shimmin roadway can contribute no-
thing to appellants. Neither does their evidence show 
continuous usage nor to what extent their usage per-
tained to each year. 
There were a number of interruptions after 1951 by 
Shimmins to any pretended or claimed adverse use by 
appellants, as follows: 
1. Breaking of Critchlows lock on Gate 2 by 
Lynn Shimmin in 1952. 
2. Blocking the road and keeping John Critch-
low waiting to go with armed men in deer-
hunting party at the rocks in 1953 and assert-
ing it was Shimmins' road. 
3. Placing and replacing locks on gates by 
Shimmins exclusively in 1953 and continu-
ously thereafter. 
4. Making Critchlows ask for keys to gain ac-
cess through locked gates year after year 
when locks were changed or replaced. 
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5. Replace Gate 2 with a metal gate in 1960's. 
6. Attorney Luck Pappas' letter (Exhibit 17) in 
1968 claiming right of way in appellant John 
Critchlow over Shimmin lands and rejected 
by Funnon Shimmin with reply that Critch-
low use was without right and non-
negotiable, being permissive only. 
7. Alleged blocking of road by Shimmons on 
September 29, 1971, causing this lawsuit. 
If it is true that John Critchlow and Foster Shimmin 
rode together in 1936 over the Shimmin property to 
place salt out on the rim by Section 31, it must be 
presumed without any other testimony that that inci-
dent was friendly, neighborly, permissive and by the 
consent and license of the owner. There is not one word 
in the record of a claim of right, adverse user or notice of 
hostile exercise of continuous disregard of the rights of 
Shimmins as owners of the property in question over 
which a roadway or easement is claimed by appellants. 
25 Am. Jur. 2nd 462 states the following: 
"Use by express or implied permission or 
license, no matter how long continued, cannot 
ripen into an easement by prescription. Furth-
ermore, if the original use by the claimant is by 
permission, it is presumed to so continue. 
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Where the owner constructs a way over his 
land for his own use and convenience, the 
mere use thereof by others which in no way 
interfers with his use will be presumed to be by 
way of license or permission." 
The appellants have failed to show by probative 
evidence that a twenty year adverse period of user was 
initiated, continued or completed. At least there is no-
thing to show that a claim of right to an easement against 
Foster Shimmin and Vera Shimmin, as owners of the 
lands up through 1962, had been open, notorious, con-
tinuous, uninterrupted, exclusive, hostile or without 
permission and thereafter acquiesced in or submitted to 
for a period of twenty years. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN FIND-
ING THAT APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTI-
TLED TO A WAY OF NECESSITY OVER THE 
PROPERTY Of* RESPONDENTS CRITCH-
LOW. 
T!*e properties partitioned to John Critchlow 
(green) and Jay Critchlow (red) are not and never were 
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contiguous. The partition occurred by decision of three 
referees and was "approved, allowed, settled and con-
firmed in every respect' ' by Judge Ruggieri knowing 
there was no established road from the north parcel to 
the south parcel and that the acreages were unequal and 
with limited access. No appeal was taken from the parti-
tion suit though there were motions for recondiseration 
and for a new trial on the issues of access and who was 
entitled to which parcel (Exhibits 18, 19, 20, and 21). 
When the two parcels were owned in common by 
the Critchlow brothers, they had access over the Mathis 
property which separated the parcels by reason of an 
exchange agreement with Rex Mathis. Because of the 
partition, a court cannot grant a way of necessity over 
the Mathis property nor over the Shimmin property. 
Where the parcels are not contiguous, neither can the 
court order a way of necessity over one of the separate 
parcels. The appellants have not shown a necessity 
exists for a way over the red parcel partitioned to Jay 
Critchlow. Neither is this a proper case for a "way of 
necessity/ ' 25 Am. Jur. 2nd 448-449 under Easements 
reads as follows: 
"A way of necessity is dependent on unity 
of ownership of the dominant and servient es-
tates, followed by a severance thereof. A way of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
necessity cannot be claimed over the land of a 
third person, and it cannot exist where neither 
the party claiming the way nor the owner of the 
land over which it is claimed, nor anyone 
under whom they or either of them claim, was 
ever seised of both tracts of land at the same 
time. Moreover, there must have been an abso-
lute ownership of both tracts. A way of neces-
sity does not arise, for example, where the 
grantor owned merely anlindivided interest in 
the land over which the right is claimed/ ' 
At page 450 of 25 Am. Jur. 2nd, it is stated also that a 
way of necessity must be more than a mere convenience 
and probably be a strict or absolute necessity. It is obvi-
ous that unless a prescriptive right over the Shimmin 
parcel can be established by the appellants, that a way 
decreed to Appellants by the Court over the red parcel of 
Jay Critchlow would be useless. The Complaint re-
peatedly complains that the plaintiffs (Appellants) are 
denied vehicular access, but never is it alleged that they 
have no access or are denied usual, reasonable or ordi-
nary access. Vehicle access is a convenience, not a 
necessity, to these particular grazing lands of appel-
lants, especially when it is realized the use of the land 
for cattle remains the same today as it has for over thirty 
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years. You still round up cattle on hundreds of acres of 
range land in mountainous areas on horseback or afoot. 
Appellants have other avenues of ingress and egress or 
to pursue building a rubber-tired access road up Dead-
man Canyon to their property if they desired to improve 
their means of access (Tr 255-257, 212-219). Appellants 
apparently have not sought a means of ingress and eg-
ress with the Mathis people to the west with whom they 
previously exchanged use of property. Such alterna-
tives might prove more costly than to demand a free 
road and maintainance thereof from Shimmins. 
POINT III 
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN FIND-
ING THAT THE APPELLANTS WERE NOT 
ENTITLED TO DAMAGES AGAINST RE-
SPONDENTS. 
The trial court found in favor of the respondents 
and against the appellants on the facts. Since there is no 
right of way in favor of appellants, there could be no 
damages for infringement of such right of way. 
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CONCLUSION 
The lower court had ample evidence that no pre-
scriptive right of way had been proven by appellants 
and that therefore no way of necessity existed nor were 
there any damages. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DEAN W. PAYNE 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Respondent VERA SHIMMIN 
128 East Center Street 
P. O. Box 733 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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